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Abstract
In this paper I quantize the stag hunt game in the framework proposed by Marinatto and Weber which,
is introduced to quntize the Battle of the Sexes game and gives a general quntization scheme of various
game theories. Then I discuss the Nash equibilium solution in the cases of which starting strategies are
taken in both non entangled state and entangled state and uncover the structure of Nash Equilibrium
solutions and compare the case of the Battle of the Sexes game. Since the game has 4 parameters in the
payoff matrix has rather rich structure than the Battle of the Sexes game with 3-parameters in the payoff
matrix, the relations of the magnitude of these payoff values in Nash Equilibriums are much involuved.
This structure is uncovered completly and it is found that the best strategy which give the maximal sum of
the payoffs of both players strongly depends on the initial quntum state. As the bonus of the formulation
the stag hunt game with four parameters we can discuss various types of symmetric games played by two
players by using the latter formulation, i.e. Chicken game. As result some common properties are found
between them and the stag hunt game. Lastly a little remark is made on Prisoner’s Dillemma.
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1 Introduction
Recent speed of the study of quntum computation and quantum information processing is much remarkable[1]
and a few years ago the quantization of game theories have started in context of quntum information[3, 4, 6].
Two quantization schemes for game theory have been proposed since. One is the scheme by Eisert et al.[4]
and another by Marinatto et al.mar. Many researchers, however, have studied quantization of game thyeory in
the frame work of the first formulationis by this time. Games investigated are mainly Prisoner’s Dilemma and
moreover the Battle of Sexes game, Chicken game and so on. The battle of sexes games which is a symmetric
game with three paremeters in the payoff bi-matrix are only studied by using the latter formalism[6].
In this article we discuss various types of symmetric games played by two players by using the latter
formulation. Especially the stag hunt game is studied in details which has four parameters in the synnetric
payyoff bi-matrix like many famous games and so we can discuss a general games, i.e. Chicken game, with four
parameters in the same context of the stag hunt game[7]. The special properties different from these famous
games with four parameters is that the payoffs of both players in the stag hunt game are same value at all
Nash Equilibrium. Some charastic aspects are also discussed for the stag hunt game.
Our plan in this article is as follows. In section 2, the definition of the stag hunt game are given
and the classical Nash Equilibrium are discussed. We review the latter formalism of quntization for game
theory following the paper written by Marinatto et al.[?] in the section 3. In the section 4 the stag hunt
game is quantized according to the latter formalism[6] and quntum Nash Equilibrium are given together with
the payoff of both playses. The relations of the magnitude of these payoff values in Nash Equilibriums are
explored in detaila and best strategy which give the maximal sum of the payoffs of both players depending
on the initial quntum state (strategy). The whole aspects as the function of a parameter representing itial
quntum state are summarized in a figure. We find that the structure of the relations of magnitudes among
payoff functions becomes rather complicated. If we would always choose the maximum payoff solution among
them, the solution is determined uniquely, depending on the initial quantum state, completly. The last section
5 is devoted to discussions on some famous symmetric games with four parameters in the payoff bi-matrises
and some common properties are found between them and the stag hunt game. Lastly a little remark is made
on Prisoner’s Dillemma.
2 Classical stag hunt Game and its Nash Equilibrium
In this section we make a review of a useual (classical) stag hunt game, show what is the Nash equilibrium
solution in this game and explain a dilemmma of this game. This solution will be needed to compare with a
quntum one of the game. In the game, both players simultaneously choose their actions (Static Game) and each
player knows perfectly the values of the payoff functions of all his (her) opponents (Complete Information).
Notations in this paper is followings;
1. the number of players are represented by i, · · · , N . In this paper N is fixed to be 2 throughout.
2.The set of strategies is discrete and it constitutes the strategyic space Si available to each player.
3. The payoff functions $i = $i(s1, s2, · · · , sN ) assign i-th player a real number depending on the strategies
chosen by his(her) opponents.
2.1 stag hunt Game
The stag hunt game is a non-zero sum game and the payoff bimatrix of this game in 2 × 2 symmetric case is
given by Fig.1, where the strategy C means cooperation and the D means defection[2]. Players are a man,
Bob and a woman, Alice as referred in the usal game theory.
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Fig. 1. Payoff function in the stag hunt game.
Here a, b, c, d are real numbers and the conndition a > b > c > d is required for the stag hunt game. In
this paper we analytically pursue a discussion as possible as we can and so we do not assign them any explicit
values.
This game may be interpreted as follows. Tow persons want to hunt a deer or a rabit. If they cooprate
together in the hunting, they can get a big game, a deer and divid it into two parts. He, however, by himself
can get only a small game, a rabit. So what they cooperate is the best strategy each other. It, however,
does not always follow that his opponent cooperates with him when he will cooperate. If one person believes
that his opponent always cooperates and he really cooperates with the opponent, while the opponent does not
cooperate and is going to take a rabit alone, then the payoff he can get become to be the lowest value because
the opponent can get by himself a rabit but he can get nothing and so he is very chagrined. Conversely when
he defects and the opponent cooperates, he can get a rabit by himself and monopolize it, but the opponent can
get nothing. Then he will get the larger payoff than in the case both of them get rabit, respectively. Notice
that the the payoff function of Fig.1 with the condition a > b > c > d well reflects this situation.
2.2 Nash Equilibrium solution
When a payoff function is given, the game theory presents various solutions of what players should act in the
game. The most significant solution in non- zero-sum games is Nash Equilibrium. In general non-zero-sum
N players games, the set of strategies (s∗1, s
∗
2, · · · , s∗N ) constitute Nash Equilibrium, if, for each player i, the
strategy s∗i satisfies the following equation:
$i(s
∗
1, s
∗
2, · · · , s∗i−1, s∗i , s∗i+1, · · · , s∗N ) ≥ $i(s∗1, s∗2, · · · , s∗i−1, si, s∗i+1, · · · , s∗N) (1)
for every strategy si belonging to the i-th strategic space Si. So Nash Equilibrium corresonds to a set of
strategies, each one representing the best choice for each single player if all his opponents take their best
choice, too.
There are two Nash Equilibriums in the stag hunt game. They are easily found to be (D,D) or (C,C).
2.3 Mixed Classical Strategies
In this section we study mixed classical strategies made in usal game theories. We know that when the
strategies are spread to mixed strategies, there are always some Nash Equilibriums[9]. In mixed strategieas
Alice takes the strategy C with the possibility p and D with the possibility 1− p. Bob adopts the strategy C
with the possibility q and D with the possibility 1 − q. The conditions 0 ≥ p ≥ 1 and 0 ≥ q ≥ 1 should be
imposed on the probabilities, for they means possibility.
Then Nash Equilibriums in the mixed strategies can be estimated as follows. The expectation value of
Alice’s reward $A and Bob’s $B one are given by
$A(p, q) = pqa+ p(1− q)d+ q(1− p)b+ (1− p)(1 − q)c, (2)
$B(p, q) = pqa+ p(1− q)b+ q(1− p)d+ (1− p)(1 − q)c. (3)
From them and the condition for Nash Equilibriums given in (1) we obtain
∆A ≡ $A(p∗, q∗)− $A(p, q∗) = (p∗ − p){q∗(a− b) + (1− q∗)(d− c)} ≥ 0, (4)
∆B ≡ $B(p∗, q∗)− $B(p∗, q) = (q∗ − q){p∗(a− b) + (1 − p∗)(d− c)} ≥ 0. (5)
Throughout all caluclations, noticing that there is a symmetry,
A⇐⇒ B, b⇐⇒ d, (6)
is useful. Three solutions can be found from the equations (4) and (5).
[1]p∗ = q∗ = 1
In this case two players get the same reward,
$A(1, 1) = $B(1, 1) = a. (7)
[2]p∗ = q∗ = 0
In this case two players also get the same reward,
$A(0, 0) = $B(0, 0) = c. (8)
[3]p∗ = q∗ = c−d
a−b+c−d ≡ m
In this case the reward of two players are
$A(m,m) = $B(m,m) =
ac− bd
a− b+ c− d > 0. (9)
By calculating directly, the following relations hold good among estimated rewards;
$(0, 0) = a > b > $(m,m) > c = $(1, 1) > d, (10)
where $ with no suffix means $ = $A = $B.
3 Quantization Scheme of Game Theory
Firstly the quntization has been discussed by Meyer[3]. At the present day tow ways for the quantization of
game theory has been known. One is the formulation by Eisert et al[4]. and another is the one by Marianatto
et al.[6]. We follow the latter method since it is clear to calculate various quantities in the letter formulation
and in the Battle of sexes game the situation becomes corather mplex than in the analysis made by first
formulation, that is, there are infinite Nash Equilibriums[?, du] Our aim is to cpmpare the results discussed
by Marinatto et al.[6], where quantum strategies can give better results than classical strategies and discuss
the universality of the superriority of quantum strategies to classical ones.
many studies by using the method has not been made yet. In the next subsection we present the
formulation given by Marianotto et al.[6] in the case oh the stag hunt game.
The quntization of game theory proposed by Marinotto et al. [6]. consists of the following steps.
[1]Unlike in the classical game theory, we first fix an arbitrary initial quantum state belonging to the
Hilbert space S = SA⊗ SB , obtained as a direct product of the two strategic spaces of the two players, whose
orthognal bases consist of the vectors associated to the pure strategies∗ classically.
[2] Each player can manipulate the initial state vector (strategy) by performing some local transformation
to obtain a suitable final state vector which will represent the quntum strategy the two players are going to play†
[3]The expected payoff of each player have to be evaluated by calculating the squared modula of the
projections of the final quantum state onto the basis vectors of space S, and then by adding up the obtained
values multiplied by the appropriate payoff coefficients deducible from the payoff bimatrix.
[4]Each player has to eventually play the clasicall pure strategy, which results a measurement process on
the final strategy, that is, a projection onto the basis vectors.
These process are summarized in Fig.2.
In calculating explicitly the physical quanties I follow density matrix approach introduced by Marinotto
et al.[6]. In the case of the stag hunt game the basis vectors are
|C >, |D >, (11)
∗Notice that Marinotto et al. used the word ’strategy’ in an unusal meaning. They call the initial state in a game ’strategy’.
†In the language employed by Marinotto et al. the word ’strategy’ coresponds to the initial state and the word ’tactics’ means
the operators related to the transformation.
where |C > represent a cooperate state and on the other hand |D > represent a defect state, respectively. Let
introduce a unitary and hermitian operator U interchange vectors |C > and |D >‡;
U |C > = |D >,
U |D > = |C >,
C† = C = C−1. (12)
The our assumption is that each palyer can modify his own strategy by applying to his reduced part of the
total density matrix ρin, which represents the initial state of the game, so transformed (final) density matrix
is given by
ρAfin = [pIρ
A
inI
† + (1 − p)UρAinU †], (13)
ρBfin = [qIρ
B
inI
† + (1− q)UρBinU † (14)
where Alice acts with the identity I with probability p and with U with probability (1 − p) and Bob acts
the same operator with probabolity q and (1 − q), respectively. From equation (13) and (14) the following
expression for the final density matrix is obtained;
ρfin = pq(IA ⊗ IB)ρin(I†A ⊗ I†B) + p(1− q)(IA ⊗ UB)ρin(I†A ⊗ U †B)
+(1− p)q(UA ⊗ IB)ρin(U †A ⊗ I†B)
+(1− p)(1− q)(UA ⊗ UB)ρin(U †A ⊗ U †B). (15)
In order to calculate the payoff functions, we introduce the following two operators;
PA = a|CC >< CC| + c(|CD >< CD|+ |DC >< DC|) + b|DD >< DD|, (16)
PB = b|CC >< CC|+ c(|CD >< CD|+ |DC >< DC|) + a|DD >< DD|. (17)
After all, the payoff functions can be evaluated by employing these operators;
$A = Tr(PAρin), (18)
$B = Tr(PBρin). (19)
Why this formulae for payoff functions corresponds to the above mentioned quantization formulation is
explicitly given by Marinatto et al.[6]. Eventually in this formalisum, th tactics or local operator corresponds
to the special unitary matrix U ∈ SU(2);
U =
[ √
p ieiφ
√
1− p
ieiφ
√
1− p √p
]
, (20)
where φ is an arbitrary phase factor§.
4 Quantization of stag hunt Game and its Nash Equilibrium
I explicitly calculate the payof functions in the case of the deer huntion game according to the formulation
of the previous section. Moreover we show that there are three Nash Equilibriums in the game and make a
discuss on the properties of them in datails.
‡we can really show that such a situation is possible by explicitly giving the representation of the state vectors and the operator:
for example it is done by choose |C >=
[
1
0
]
, D =
[
0
1
]
and U = σx, the first Pauli matrix.
§This form do not cover all the ranges of SU(2) and that general SU(2) matorix should be considered as tacticses is pointed
out[12, 8]
4.1 The case of Non-entanglrd Strategy
In this section we discuss the case where an initial state (strategy) is a factorizable state. When started with
the factrizable state, in all game studied by using both formulations of quantization of game theory, it is known
that the results are the same as in the case of the classical analysis.
We start with an initial state |CC >¶. Then we obtain from equation (15);
ρfin = pq|CC >< CC|+ p(1− q)|CD >< CD|+ (1− p)q|DC >< DC|
+(1− p)(1 − q)|DD >< DD|. (21)
We can find three Nash Equilibriums same as ones in the classical case.
[1] p = q = 1
In this case ρfin is given by
ρfin = |CC >< CC| (22)
and the payoff is evaluated from equations (18) and (19);
$A = $B = a. (23)
[2]p = q = 0
In this case ρfin is given by
ρfin = |DD >< DD| (24)
and the payoff is evaluated from equations (18) and (19);
$A = $B = c. (25)
[3]p = q = m
m is the same value as the one given in [3] in the section 2.3. In this case ρfin is given by
ρfin = m
2|CC >< CC|+m(1−m)(|CD >< CD|+ |DC >< DC|)
+(1−m)(1−m)|DD >< DD| (26)
and the payoff is given by
$A = $B =
ac− bd
a− b+ c− d > 0. (27)
As we expect all the results are the same as the ones in the classical case.
4.2 The case of entangled Strategy
Useually the most interesting case is when entangled states, which is essentialy the peculiar to quntum
mecanics[11], are taken as an initial state. We begin with general entangled state
|ψin >= α|CC > +β|DD > with |α|+ |β| = 1. (28)
¶it is not significant which factrizable state is taken as an initial strategy since all factorizable states can be given by applying
an appropriate unitary transformation on an arbitraly factorizable state.
Then by calculating directly from definitions, we get
ρin = |α|2|CC >< CC|+ αβ∗|CC >< DD|
+α∗β|DD >< CC|) + |β|2|DD >< DD|, (29)
PA = a|CC >< CC| + d|CD >< CD|+ b|DC >< CC|)
+c|DD >< DD|, (30)
and
ρfin = (pq + |β|2(1− p− q))|CC >< CC|+ (pq + |α|2(1− p− q))|DD >< DD|
+(αβ∗pq + |α|∗b(1− p)(1− q))|CC >< DD|
+(αβ∗(1− p)(1 − q) + |α|∗bpq)|DD >< CC|
+(−pq + |α|2q + |β|2p)|DC >< DC|
+(−pq + |α|2p+ |β|2q)|CD >< C|
+(αβ∗p(1− q) + |α|∗b(1− p)q)|CD >< DC|
+(αβ∗q(1− p) + |α|∗b(1− q)p)|DC >< CD|.
(31)
By using equations (18) and (19), we can evaluate the payoff functions;
$A = pq(a+ c− b− d) + p(|α|2(d− c) + |β|2(b − a))
+q(|α|2(b− c) + |β|2(d− a)) + a|β|2 + c|α|2, (32)
$B = pq(a+ c− b− d) + p(|α|2(b− c) + |β|2(d− a))
+q(|α|2(d− c) + |β|2(b − a)) + a|β|2 + c|α|2. (33)
So we obtain
∆A ≡ $A(p∗, q∗)− $A(p, q∗)
= (p∗ − p) [q∗(a+ c− b− d) + |α|2(d− c) + |β|2(b− a)] , (34)
∆B ≡ $B(p∗, q∗)− $B(p∗, q)
= (q∗ − q) [p∗(a+ c− b− d) + |α|2(d− c) + |β|2(b− a)] . (35)
From these, we can find three Nash Equilibriums.
[1]p∗ = q∗ = 1
The payoff function is given by
$A(1, 1) = $B(1, 1) = a|α|2 + c|β|2. (36)
[2]p∗ = q∗ = 0
The payoff function is given by
$A(0, 0) = $B(0, 0) = c|α|2 + a|β|2. (37)
[3]p∗ = q∗ = mq
The definition of mq is
mq =
(c− d)|α|2 + (a− b)|β|2
a− b+ c− d . (38)
After long and tedious calculation, the payoff function is given by
$A(mq,mq) = $B(mq,mq) =
(ac− bd) + |α|2|β|2(a+ b− c− d)(a− b− c+ d)
a− b+ c− d . (39)
When we take α = 1 or β = 1, it can be seen easily that the peculiar property different from the Battle
of the Sexes game appears. Then we find the following relation;
$(1, 1) = c < $(mq,mq) =
ac− bd
a− b+ c− d < $(0, 0) = a, for|a| = 0, (40)
$(0, 0) = c < $(mq,mq) =
ac− bd
a− b+ c− d < $B(0, 0) = a, for|b| = 0. (41)
Such a relation does not appear in the Battle of the Sexes game in any parameter regions at all. On the other
hand we can get the same relation as the case of the Battle of the Sexes game when we choose |α| = |β| = 1/√2;
$(0, 0) = $(1, 1) =
a+ c
2
> $(mq,mq) =
a+ b+ c+ d
2
. (42)
In the battle of the Sexes game, this relation always hold good in all the parameter gegion[6].
From these situation, we wonder whether there is the case such as $(0, 0), $(1, 1) < $(mq,mq) and
furthermore we sholuld generally investigate the all relations standing for $(0, 0), $(1, 1), $(mq,mq) in
the all parameter regions for |α, β, a, b, c, d systematically. For the purpose, we calculate explicitelly
∆(1,1) ≡ $(1, 1)− $(mq,mq) and ∆(0,0) ≡ $(0, 0)− $(mq,mq).
After long but straightforward calculation, we obtain the following form for ∆(1, 1);
∆(1,1) = C1X
2 +B1X +A1, (43)
where
C1 =
(a+ b− c− d)(a − b− c+ d)
a− b+ c− d , (44)
B1 = a− b+ C1, (45)
A1 =
(b− c)(c− d)
−a+ b− c+ d < 0, (46)
X = |α|2. (47)
The solutions of equation ∆(1,1) = C1X
2 +B1X +A1 = 0 turn to be
x
(1)
+ =
(b− c)
a+ b− c− d, (48)
x
(1)
− =
c− d
−a+ b+ c− d. (49)
Moreover noticing that
0 < x
(1)
+ < 1, 0 ≤ X ≤ 1 (50)
∆(1,1)(X = 0) = A1 < 0, (51)
∆(1,1)(X = 1) = A1 +B1 + C1 > 0, (52)
and using the standard results of the theory of quadratic equation, we can obtain the following relations for
sign of ∆(1,1);
X > x
(1)
+ =⇒ ∆(1,1) > 0,
X = x
(1)
+ =⇒ ∆(1,1) = 0,
X < x
(1)
+ =⇒ ∆(1,1) < 0. (53)
For ∆(0, 0), we can lead to the following equation;
∆(0,0) = C0X
2 +B0X +A, (54)
where
C0 =
(a+ b− c− d)(a− b− c+ d)
a− b+ c− d = C1, (55)
B0 = a− b+ C1 = B1, (56)
A0 =
(a− b)(a− d)
a− b+ c− d > 0. (57)
The solutions of equation ∆(0,0) = 0 turn to be
x
(0)
− =
(a− d)
a+ b− c− d , (58)
x
(0)
+ =
a− b
a− b− c+ d . (59)
Moreover noticing that
0 < x
(0)
− < 1, 0 ≤ X ≤ 1 (60)
∆(0,0)(X = 0) = A0 > 0, (61)
∆(0,0)(X = 1) = A0 +B0 + C0 < 0, (62)
and by making paralell argument with the case of ∆(1,1), we can obtain the relations for ∆(0,0);
X > x
(0)
− =⇒ ∆(0,0) < 0,
X = x
(0)
− =⇒ ∆(0,0) = 0,
X < x
(0)
− =⇒ ∆(0,0) > 0. (63)
Consequently the relative magnitudes of payoff functions as |α|2 become larger are summerized as follows.
(1)$(0, 0) > $(mq,mq) > §(1, 1) for 0 ≤ |α|2 < x(1)+ ,
(2)$(0, 0) > $(mq,mq) = §(1, 1) for |α|2 = x(1)+ ,
(3)$(0, 0) > §(1, 1) > $(mq,mq) for x(1)+ < |α|2 <
1
2
,
(4)$(0, 0) = §(1, 1) > $(mq,mq) for |α|2 = 1
2
,
(5)$(1, 1) > §(0, 0) > $(mq,mq) for 1
2
< |α|2 < x(0)− ,
(6)$(1, 1) > §(0, 0) = $(mq,mq) for |α|2 = x(0)− ,
(7)$(1, 1) > $(mq,mq) > §(0, 0) for x(0)− < |α|2 ≤ 1.
This results are consistent with the preliminary arguments in equations () and (). Marinatto et al.[6] conclude
that we there is a unique Nash Equilibrium at |α|2 = |β|2 = 12 and the Dilemma in this game are resolved.
It, however, has been pointed out that the degeneracy of Nash Equilibrium is not resolve completly. The
communications between two players are needed to resolve the degeneracy[8].
Since four parameters are needed in the stag hunt game not but three in the Battle of the Sexes game,
the structure of the relations representing the relative magnitudes among payoff functions becomes rather
complex. While $a 6= $in the Battle of the Sexes game, $A = $B satisfies for any p, q in the stag hunt game
and the situation in stag hunt game is essentially different from the one in the Battle of the Sexes game. In
the stag hunt game the same strategies are always taken but three solutions exist for any p, q. If we would
always choose the maximum payoff solution among them, the solution is determined uniquely. Aspecially at
|α|2 = |β|2 = 12 , the same situation as the Battle of the Sexes game occurs in the stag hunt game. At the
point we really see $(0, 0) = $(1, 1) > $(mq,mq) like the Battle of the Sexes game. Generally, however, the
strategy with the best payoff depends on the initial quantum state, that is, |α|, |β|. There are not the case
the mixed strategy give best payoff as in the classical case. The classical case corresponds to the case with
|α|2 = 12 in the quntum case where p = q = 1 give the best payoff for both players. On the other hand at
|α|2 < 12bin quantum case, the best payoff comes when p = q = 0 and such situation never occur classically!.
Which strategy can give best payoff depends on the given initial state, completly.
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Figure 1: Payoff of the stag hunt game vs. |α|2 (left side graph) and payoff of the Leader game vs. |α|2 (right
side graph).
5 Discussion
By quntizing the stag hunt game along Marinott[], we find that the pecurial strategy give the best payoff
which the situation never occurs in classical treatment and clear the structure of Nach Equilibrium solutions
as function the initial quantum state |α|, |β|2 = 12 . The structure is rather complex since the stag hunt game
has four parameters in the payoff bi-matrix while there are three parameters in taht of the Battle of the Sexes
game.
We give the general forms of payoff function of both player in 2× 2 symmetric bi-matrix game with the four
parameters where is the bonus in this paper and so we can discuss general games with this form. Amon them
the intersting games referred in many books of game theory are
(i) Chicken game; b > a > d > c, (64)
(ii) Leader game; b > d > a > c, (65)
(iii) Secrete meeting game; d > b > a > c, (66)
(iv) Prisoner′s Dilemma game; b > a > c > d, (67)
where the inequalitys show the order of the magnitude in each payoff bi-matrix. We briefly discuss the four
games with the special case that the biggest value in the payoff bi-matrix is normalized to be 1 and the smallest
one is to be 0. Furthermore The second bigger value is taken 23 and the third bigger value is taken
1
3 . The
values of the payoff bi-matrix are arranged at regular intervals between 0 and 1.
First three games (Chickin, Leader and Secrete meeting games) have three Nach Equilibriums in the
same way as their classical versions. They are (i)p = 1, q = 0, (ii)p = 0, q = 1 and (iii)p = q = d−c
b+d−a−c . The
Prisoner’s Dilemma game shows very different aspect from these three games and will be discussed separately
from them. When the special values of the payoff bi-matricses, such as introduced in the above discussion,
payoff function v.s. |a|2 are given in table 1 and their values v.s. |a|2 are given in the left hand side of the
figure 1 (Chickin, and Secrete meating games) and the right hand side in the figure 1 (Leader game) where
each sloping line must be exchanged in (p, q) = (1, 0). The same notation should be applied for the left hand
side of figure 1 in Chickin and Secrete meating games. The essential results are same as the one of the stag
hunt game and the difference between the figure 2 and 3 depens on how the parameters in payoff functions
are chosen and is not crusial.
p = 1, q = 0 p = 1, q = 0 p = q = m
Chickin Game ( |a|
2
3 + |b|2, |a|2 + |b|
2
3 ) (|a|2 + |b|
2
3 ,
|a|2
3 + |b|2) (12 , 12 )
Leader Game (2|a|
2
3 + |b|2, |a|2 + |b|
2
3 ) (|a|2 + 2|b|
2
3 ,
2|a|2
3 + |b|2) (12 , 12 )
Secrete Meeting Game (|a|2 + 2|b|23 , 2|a|
2
3 + |b|2) (2|a|
2
3 + |b|2, |a|2 + 2|b|
2
3 ) (
1
2 ,
1
2 )
Table 1. Payoff functions of Nash Equilibrium in the symmetric games with four parameters in bi-matrix
where the parameters are taken to be 1, 2/3, 1/3, 0 in orderof the magnitude. The first values in the
parentheses mean the payoff values of player A and second one mean the ones of player B.
At |a|2 = |b|2 = 12 , which is maximal entangled sate, in the all three games, Nash Equilibrium point
corresponding to a mixed strategy is equally to be m = 12 same as the classical case! At this point, $(1, 0) =
$(0, 1) ≥ $(m,m) and Nash Equilibrium p = 1, q = 0 and p = 0, q = 1 are better than another Nash
Equilibrium p = q = m in the view of payoff. When getting out of this point means, the degeneracy of
p = 1, q = 0 and p = 0, q = 1 is resolved.
Totally these games with four parameters in the payoff bi-matrix including tha stag hunt game have three
Nash Equilibriums and the best strategy among them in the sense that the sum of the payoffs of both players
become maximum strongly depends on the quntum initial state (strategy). This aspect is drastically different
from clasical situations.
Lastly we make a smallremark on Prisoner’s Dilemma whic has a dominated strategy (defect,Defect).
Which strategy is best depends on the quntum initial state (strategy) intricately even when the parameters
are taken to be fix to be a special value stisfying b + d < 2a and a dominanated strategy is not always best
strategy. For example in the case of b = 1, a = 5/6, c = 1/3, d = 0, a mixed strategy (p, q)neq(0, 1) and (1, 0)
becomes best strategy in the view of paypff function at |α| ∼ 0 or |α| ∼ 1. The details seems to depend
strongly on the various parameter and the analysis wmay be very intricate. So the discussion on the complete
analysis for Prisoner’s Dilemma is beyond this paperwhose aim mainly is to discuss stag hunt game.
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